Abstract -
INTRODUCTION
N onprofit organizations constitute over 10 percent of the Unites States Gross Domestic Product and supply a significant portion of social services (Meckstroth and Arnsberger, 1998) . Principal sources of nonprofit financing include private donations, government grants, and the sales of products or services. Private donations and government grants constitute tax-exempt revenue (private donations are also tax-deductible by the donor), but some portion of profits from sales activities may be taxable.
1 IRC §511 imposes an unrelated business income tax (UBIT) on the portion of net taxable profits (i.e., taxable revenues less taxable expenses) from sales that are unrelated to nonprofits' primary exempt missions. Common examples of taxable activities include advertising in exempt organization periodicals, private musical concerts at university facilities, and hospital pharmacy sales to non-patients. Congressional records suggest that the purpose of the UBIT is to prevent unfair competition with forprofit firms, although observers note that the UBIT also has a role in promoting efficient production choices by nonprofits (Hansmann, 1989) .
One justification for the use of tax benefits to promote the private provision of these goods is that nonprofits are more efficient suppliers of certain kinds of public goods than are governments. This private provision effectively relieves the government from otherwise funding the goods via a taxing and redistribution system. Examining what factors affect the supply of private donations is important because shortfalls in the funding of necessary public goods would require additional government taxation and expenditure.
Beginning with Clotfelter (1980) , a substantial body of research examines price (i.e., income tax rate) and income effects on the supply of charitable donations and generally finds that higher tax rates and personal income encourage additional donations. More recently, research has investigated donor response to alternative nonprofit funding sources, such as government grants and profits from sales activities, both of which may crowd-out (or potentially crowd-in) the supply of private donations (Abrams and Schmitz, 1984; Schiff, 1985; Weisbrod and Dominguez, 1986; Khanna, Posnett, and Sandler, 1995; Segal and Weisbrod, 1998; and Okten and Weisbrod, 2000) . Crowding-out will occur if donors believe that nonprofits with high levels of alternative funding sources do not need additional private donations, or if donors are averse to nonprofits' sales activities. Crowdingin will occur if alternative revenue sources are complementary to private donations.
The primary contribution of our study is its examination of the effects of the taxable portion of nonprofit sales revenues on the supply of private donations. Although the taxable portion of profits from sales activities is relatively small, it is nonprofits' fastest growing revenue source, doubling every five years (Meckstroth and Arnsberger, 1998) . As Steinberg (1991) notes, the relationship between private donations and taxable activities is ex-ante unclear. Sales activities that are consistent with the nonprofit's charitable mission are tax-exempt. Taxable sales activities are by definition ancillary and unrelated to a nonprofit's primary mission, and therefore donors may have a particular distaste for them. On the other hand, donors may favorably view unrelated taxable activities as a form of "self-help." The unavailability of nonprofit income tax return data (i.e., the IRS 990-T), which are subject to the same confidentiality rules as other income tax data, has hampered prior analysis of this issue. We overcome the data limitation problem by using a unique database of confidential nonprofit tax returns.
By focusing on taxable revenues, our paper makes two additional contributions. First, it sheds some light on the conflicting results of prior research examining the effects of nonprofits' sales activities on the supply of donations (Weisbrod and Dominguez, 1986; Khanna, Posnett, and Sandler, 1995; Segal and Weisbrod, 1998; and Okten and Weisbrod, 2000) . This research posits that donors are averse to nonprofit commercialization. These studies use total sales revenues as a measure of nonprofit commercialization, a feature that could account for the mixed findings. For example, although student tuition is included in sales revenues, it is not necessarily a good indicator of a university's pursuit of ancillary commercial revenues. Access to confidential tax return data permits us to disentangle the effects of taxable and tax-exempt sales revenues, which is important because taxable sales are by definition ancillary and commercial; while tax-exempt sales revenues are not.
Second, the paper empirically evaluates the reasonableness of the assertion in Sansing (1998) that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the UBIT can promote inefficient production choices. In Sansing's model, the UBIT introduces inefficient production choices by nonprofits if taxable activities crowd-out private donations, thereby decreasing the returns to taxable activities to the point where taxable output is under-produced. An important and untested feature of Sansing's model is that taxable activities crowd-out donations.
We find that donations to arts, culture and humanities organizations as well as to human services and public benefit organizations fall by approximately $0.55 to $0.60 for each additional dollar of taxable revenues earned, depending on the model specification used. We do not find that donations to educational or medical nonprofits are sensitive to the level of taxable revenues earned. Further analysis breaking out total taxable revenues into specific revenue types finds that private donations are decreasing in taxable advertising revenues for both arts, culture, and humanities organizations and for human services and public benefit organizations. Private donations are also decreasing in taxable rental income for human services and public benefit organizations.
These results have several implications. First, the estimates imply that the financial benefits of taxable activities are offset to some extent by lost donations revenues. This finding is particularly important because the UBIT already reduces the financial benefits of taxable revenues with tax rates as high as 35 percent, although prior research suggests that many nonprofits are adept at reducing their UBIT rates to zero through cost allocations (Yetman, 2001a) . Second, because we document that donations are sensitive to taxable activities, our results provide empirical support for Sansing's (1998) assertion that the UBIT causes inefficient production choices by nonprofits. Finally, failure to document an association between donations and taxable activities for educational or medical nonprofits suggests that the findings of prior studies that donors to these types of nonprofits are sensitive to nonprofit commercialization may be premature.
The next section provides background information. The third section discusses our empirical procedures and the fourth section discusses our data. The fifth section presents and evaluates the results of our analysis and the last section concludes.
BACKGROUND

Determinants of Donations
There is an extensive body of literature examining the effects of various factors on the supply of charitable donations. These studies use models that can be categorized as either donor or donee models. Donor models used by Clotfelter (1980) and others consider an individual donor's choice of how much of a donation to give. These studies generally find that donations increase with tax rates and income levels. Donee models used by Abrams and Schmitz (1984) , Schiff (1985) , Weisbrod and Dominguez (1986) , and Khanna and Sandler (2000) explore a particular nonprofit's supply of donations. These studies generally document that donations are increasing in fundraising and decreasing in the price of donations. Results with respect to government grants and sales revenues are mixed.
Recently, there has been interest in the effects of commercial activities on donations. Unlike prior studies, there is no theoretical model of the effect of commercial revenues on donations. As Steinberg (1991) contends, "It would be useful to gather empirical evidence, for existing theory provides little guidance on the magnitude and direction of the interaction between donations and (taxable) commercial activity." Although no study to date has examined the effects of taxable activities on donations, prior studies examined the effects of non-taxable commercial activities on donations. Using data from the American Red Cross, Kingma (1995) finds that each dollar of profits from Cardio Pulmonary Resuscitation classes crowds out $3.59 of donations. Segal and Weisbrod (1998) utilize IRS 990 data and show that donations are generally decreasing in a proxy measure of commercial revenues (i.e., total sales revenues), although their industry-specific analysis was mixed. For hospitals, universities, and human services organizations, they note a positive association, or a crowdingin effect. For housing and arts, culture, and humanities organizations, they observe a crowding-out effect. Okten and Weisbrod (2000) use IRS 990 data and find that sales revenues crowd-in donations for arts, hospitals, and higher education nonprofits, but have no effect on donations for human services organizations. These somewhat mixed findings highlight the difficulty of using total sales revenues as a proxy for commercial activities, because total sales revenues is an aggregate of taxable and non-taxable sales revenues. Access to confidential tax return data permits us to partition taxable and non-taxable revenues, potentially addressing the somewhat conflicting results of prior research.
An important feature of the models used by prior research to estimate the effect of nonprofits' characteristics on donations is their assumption that donors receive information on nonprofits' activities in similar ways. In particular, all prior models assume that donors use nonprofits' publicly available financial reports (i.e., the IRS 990) to construct various financial ratios that supply information about nonprofits' efficiency and effectiveness in delivering charitable output. Although it is possible that donors use other information in addition to the IRS form 990, prior studies limited their tests to using IRS 990 data. It is possible, however, that donor information acquisition processes differs from our model and/or differs across nonprofit types. For example, donors to charitable organizations may depend on the IRS 990 as an information source in selecting recipients of their donations. On the other hand, donors to private universities may not rely on IRS 990 information as they may have a proclivity to donate to their alma mater regardless of the university's efficiency and effectiveness ratios. If the information acquisition process of donors is inconsistent with the modeling assumptions (i.e., that donors use the IRS 990 data), then our tests may incorrectly fail to document any effect of taxable activities on donations. For this reason, we suggest exercising particular caution when interpreting null results.
Efficiency Consequences of the UBIT
Congress enacted the UBIT in 1950 in response to claims of unfair competition, such as those levied against the Mueller Macaroni Company, which was tax-exempt because it was owned by New York University. Congressional records reveal that the passage of the tax was intended to prevent unfair competition with taxable businesses arising from nonprofits' taxexempt status and to raise revenue (U.S. House, 1950) .
Since its enactment in 1950, the necessity and efficiency of the UBIT has been the subject of considerable debate (Hines, 1999) . Industry observers have argued for expanding, contracting, and even eliminating the UBIT. Proponents of abolishing the UBIT maintain that "unfair" competition cannot occur in perfectly competitive markets because for-profit firms could reasonably anticipate the effects of nonprofit competition on required rates of return (Rose-Ackerman, 1982) . Hansmann (1989) shows that, notwithstanding issues of equity, the principal purpose of the UBIT is to promote productive efficiency and therefore the tax should remain essentially intact. The UBIT promotes productive efficiency because, without the tax, nonprofits could produce products less efficiently than their forprofit counterparts (to the extent of unlevied taxes) and still sell the products at market prices. In effect, the amount of unlevied taxes would be consumed as waste (or perquisites).
Sansing (1998) challenges the assumption that the UBIT unequivocally promotes productive efficiency by demonstrating analytically that, if nonprofits' taxable activities crowd-out donations (assuming that donations are simply wealth transfers that generate no consumer surplus) and the UBIT rate is greater than zero, nonprofits will produce an inefficiently low level of taxable output. Given that the UBIT rate is in fact greater than zero (UBIT rates parallel those of the corporate income tax), a finding that taxable revenues crowd-out donations is evidence that the UBIT fails to unequivocally promote efficient production choices by nonprofits. A more thorough understanding of the potential efficiency consequences of the UBIT may assist policymakers and others concerned with the form and function of the UBIT.
RESEARCH DESIGN Model Specification
Because we seek to model nonprofits' supply of donations, we follow prior donee literature and use the following model to estimate the effect of taxable revenues on donations in year t for nonprofit i:
By using lagged independent variables, we assume that donors respond to prioryears' information. 3 The dependent variable, Donations, is the amount of private donations and excludes government grants and feeder donations, such as those from the United Way. Taxable revenues are from the nonprofits' tax returns (i.e., the IRS 990-T). All other variables are derived from the nonprofits' publicly available information returns (i.e., the IRS 990).
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IRS 990s for most nonprofits are available at www.guidestar.org.
All variables (with the exception of Price and Age) are scaled by total nonprofit revenues, although results are not sensitive to using alternative scalars. 5 We partition our models across five of the eight major nonprofit categories as identified by the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS): educational; medical; arts, culture and humanities; human services; and public benefit organizations. 6 We combine human services and public benefit organizations for our analysis because of their similar outputs. Although the NCCS identifies eight major categories of nonprofits, we do not have sufficient sample sizes for the remaining three categories: environmental (47 observations), international (13 observations), and religious (14 observations) organizations.
Fundraising expenses are those incurred to directly generate donations, such as mail and radio solicitations. Fundraising can affect donations in two ways. First, fundraising will increase donations to the extent it increases donor awareness and communicates information 2 Similar models were used by Weisbrod and Dominguez (1986) , Khanna, Posnett, and Sandler (1995) , Segal and Weisbrod (1998) , and Okten and Weisbrod (2000) . 3 Lagging also mitigates (but does not eliminate) concern over simultaneity in that managers can alter the amount of taxable activities in response to the level of donations received. 4 Alternative specifications include various measures of nonprofit size, such as total assets or liabilities. Results using these alternative specifications are qualitatively similar. 5 We also use logarithmically transformed un-scaled continuous variables, which produce higher point estimates for taxable activity crowding-out. Although these point estimates are higher, their lower confidence interval (at the 10 percent level) is similar to those obtained using scaled variables. 6 The NCCS is a private organization empowered by the IRS to provide a nomenclature for nonprofit types and to disseminate information on nonprofits.
about the quality of the nonprofit's output (Nelson, 1974) . Second, excessive fundraising may reduce donations if donors are concerned with the portion of their donation that is spent on additional fundraising. Industry watchdog groups, such as the Better Business Bureau Wise Giving Alliance and the American Institute of Philanthropy, recommend that donors consider a nonprofit's "fundraising efficiency," or the ratio of fundraising expenses to donations, when making donation allocation decisions. The variable Price is defined as 1 / (1 -fundraising expenses / donations) and captures donor sensitivity to nonprofits' fundraising efficiency. The variable Age is the number of years a nonprofit has existed and is intended to measure a nonprofit's stock of reputation capital, which may attract donations. We also include the interaction of Age and Fundraising expenses to control for the effects of experience on fundraising productivity. Government grants and Sales revenues are included to control for possible crowding-in or crowding-out effects of these alternative revenue sources. As previously discussed, prior research uses total sales revenues as a proxy for nonprofits' commercial activities. By disaggregating taxable and non-taxable sales revenues, we are able to expand upon and compare our findings with prior research. Because the amount of sales revenues contained on the IRS 990 includes both taxable and tax-exempt activities, we subtract the amount of taxable revenues on the IRS 990-T from sales revenues on the IRS 990 for use in the model estimation. Prior research was not able to partition sales revenues into their taxable and tax-exempt portions, constraining the coefficient estimates to be equal.
Additional Model Specifications
Because of the information dissemination problems discussed earlier, we estimate a second version of our model that excludes Age and Price since, as compared with the other independent variables, these two variables may not be as easily constructed or widely known by donors for many nonprofits. We also include Endowment (i.e., total assets less total liabilities) as an additional independent variable in this second version because the overall size and presence of a nonprofit is likely to be known to a potential donor; results are not sensitive to excluding a measure of endowment.
We also estimate a third version of our model, which includes several control variables that may affect the relationship between taxable revenues and donations. This model includes all the covariates in model [1] plus the variables Sales revenues squared, Effectiveness ratio, Endowment, Publication indicator, State individual income tax rate, and Gross state product logged. We include the square of sales revenues to control for non-linearity in donors' responses. A nonprofit's effectiveness ratio is defined as program service expenses / total expenses and is intended to capture donor sensitivity to nonprofit operating performance. The IRS 990 breaks nonprofit expenses into three categories: program services that are mission related, general and administrative, and fundraising. Industry watchdog groups suggest that, in addition to fundraising efficiency, donors should also consider the proportion of a nonprofit's total expenditures that are associated with the mission-related output. Some research contends that donors are sensitive to the effectiveness ratio (Tinkelman, 1999) ; while other studies indicate that donors are not (Frumkin and Kim, 2001) .
The publication indicator is a categorical variable equal to one if the nonprofit reported expenses on schedule J of the IRS 990-T. Taxable advertising can take the form of advertisements in exempt organization periodicals or advertisements not in periodicals (i.e., radio broadcast messages or displays at athletic events). If the taxable revenues are from exempt periodicals, special rules apply and the revenues and related expenses are reported on Schedule J, which flows-through its net results to page one of the IRS 990-T. If the taxable revenues are not from periodicals, the nonprofit should report them as advertising on page one without filling out the Schedule J. 7 We include this variable to control for the possibility that donors are sensitive to exempt organization periodicals in general, rather than the taxable advertising in those periodicals. Finally, we include individual tax rates and the log of gross state products to control for the effects of varying donor propensities to provide donations (i.e., tax and income effects).
In order to test for donor reaction to particular types of taxable activities, we also estimate models with taxable revenues disaggregated into advertising, product sales, and rentals. Although the IRS 990-T breaks taxable revenues into nine categories, we examine these three because each provides us with at least 50 observations in our lagged analysis. Product sales are revenues from the sales of taxable products or services before subtraction of direct costs (i.e., cost of goods sold). Products sales and rental income are taxable if they are unrelated to the nonprofits' primary exempt purpose and regularly carried on. As previously noted, the legal definition of "unrelated" is complex and often confusing, although the general principle is that an activity is unrelated if it does not directly further the exempt charitable mission (Treasury Regulation § 1.512(a)-1). Advertising revenues are payments to the nonprofit to display, print, or otherwise transmit information about the product of a taxable entity. Not all kinds of advertising revenues are taxable. In general, passive informational advertisements, such as displaying a sporting goods company's logo, are not taxable, while "calls to action" are taxable. 8 Print advertising in exempt organization periodicals is ordinarily taxable.
DATA
The database is a pooled, cross-sectional sample of 1,824 matched sets of IRS 990s (publicly available information return) and IRS 990-Ts (not publicly available income tax return). The database is a sub-sample of the 2,316 nonprofits that reported taxable income in 1995 and that are included in the National Center for Charitable Statistics 1995 database (National Center for Charitable Statistics, 1999). The National Center database includes all nonprofits with total assets of $10 million or more, plus a stratified random sample of smaller organizations, for a total sample of approximately 12,000 nonprofits.
To collect our database of matched sets of tax returns, we requested, in writing, the past three years of IRS 990s and IRS 990-Ts from the 2,316 nonprofits that filed both forms and that are included in the National Center 's 1995 database. The 2,316 nonprofits in the sample account for only 25 percent of the total number of nonprofits that filed an IRS 990-T in 1995, but more than 85 percent of the total assets and revenues of all nonprofits with taxable income. Of the 2,316 nonprofits contacted, 703 voluntarily supplied matched sets of IRS 990s and IRS 990-Ts. Not all of the nonprofits that sent their tax forms were able to provide three continu-7 In many instances, we found that nonprofits with non-periodical advertising reported revenues on Schedule J, but not expenses. This difference drove our decision to use an indicator variable for expenses on Schedule J as our measure of advertising from periodicals. 8 For example, if a nonprofit radio station broadcasts the following advertisement; "this program brought to you by King Kong Cola, a refreshing soft drink", the advertisement would not be taxable. If, however, the advertisement stated "sponsored by King Kong Cola; buy some today!", it would be taxable because it suggested that the patron take action (i.e., purchase the product).
ous years of data. On average, our database contains 2.6 years of data from each of the 703 nonprofits, making up a total of 1,824 organization-year observations. Because sample representativeness is a potential issue, we conducted a sample representativeness test (untabulated), which finds that the sample is not jointly different from the population across total assets, total revenues, taxable revenues, total expenses and total donations. 9 We reduce our sample of 1,824 down to 1,750 because, as previously noted, we do not examine 47 environmental, 13 international, and 14 religious organization observations. Using a lagged analysis further reduces our regression analysis sample from 1,750 to 1,077. Finally, we eliminated from our sample five educational, four medical, five arts, and two human services and public benefit organizations that had a Cook's D statistic greater than one in the main regressions, limiting the analysis sample to 1,061. Table 1 contains univariate statistics for our sample of 481 educational, 767 medical, 179 arts, and 307 human services and public benefit organizations. These 1,734 observations include the sample of 1,750 (i.e., before reduction due to lagging) but exclude the 16 observations deleted as outliers. Tax-exempt sales revenues are over four times larger than private donations to educational nonprofits, over 70 times larger for medical nonprofits and about four times larger for human services and public benefit organizations. Educational nonprofits receive roughly the same proportions of donations from private and public (government) sources; while medical and charitable nonprofits receive proportionately more private donations than government grants. The average nonprofit has existed for over 30 years. The effectiveness ratios suggest that approximately 80 percent of nonprofit total expenditures are for the primary exempt purpose. Table 2 contains more detailed distributional statistics for Donations (our dependent variable) and taxable revenues. All variables in Table 2 are scaled by total revenues. Average donations comprise over 30 percent of total revenues for arts, culture, and humanities organizations, while taxable revenues make up a relatively small (3 percent) portion. Human services and public benefit organizations earn over 20 percent of their total revenues are from donations and 4 percent from taxable activities. Medical nonprofits rely primarily on tax-exempt sales revenues as donations make up only 3 percent of total revenues and taxable sales comprise only 1 percent.
RESULTS
Univariate Results
Untabulated results using Statistics of Income data from the population of nonprofits in 1995 that earned taxable revenues show that the average nonprofit earned $5.3 million in private donations, $3.9 million in government grants, and $85.9 million in sales revenues. The average nonprofit in the population had an endowment of $105.5 million in 1995. These figures compare to the aggregated (across the four nonprofit types) sample used in our analysis where the average nonprofit earned $4.3 million in private donations, $3.1 million in government grants, and $59.9 million in sales revenues. The average nonprofit in our sample had an endowment of $127.9 million. These statistics suggest that our sample is reasonably comparable across these variables. Table 3 for each of our four nonprofit groupings. We find that each additional dollar of taxable revenues earned by arts, culture, and humanities organizations crowds-out approximately $0.59 of donations (t-statistic of -2.41). We find that each additional dollar of taxable revenues earned by human services and public benefit organizations crowds-out approximately $0.55 of donations (t-statistic of -3.69). Given that the minimum financial benefit of one dollar of taxable revenues is $0.65 (i.e., the minimum financial benefit at the highest marginal federal UBIT rate is $1 × (1 -0.35) or $0.65), this estimate suggests that the financial benefits of taxable activities exceeds the financial costs of reduced donations.
Multivariate Results
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When interpreting these point estimates, readers should keep in mind that the true value can lie within reasonable confidence intervals. It is also important to note that a complete cost-benefit analysis would have to consider other costs such as the loss of donor interest or respect for the nonprofit mission and the distortionary effects of the UBIT on nonprofit production choices.
We do not find that donations to educational or medical nonprofits are sensitive to taxable activities. There are at least Sansing's (1998) assertion that taxable revenues crowd-out donations. Because the UBIT rate is greater than zero, our findings provide evidence that the UBIT likely causes nonprofits to make inefficient production choices. By directly addressing UBIT efficiency issues, our study contributes to the debate surrounding the form and function of the UBIT.
In our next set of analyses, we disaggregate taxable activities into advertising revenues, product sales, and rental revenues. Table 4 presents the results of our analysis of disaggregated taxable revenues. Results are similar when we use various other model specifications including the two alternative model specifications presented in Table 3 . Although we find negative associations between all three taxable revenue types (i.e., advertising, product sales, and rental) for both types of charitable nonprofits (i.e., arts, culture, and humanities and human services and public benefit organizations), we document statistical significance in only three instances. We find a negative association between donations and taxable advertising revenues for arts, culture, and humanities organizations, and between donations and taxable advertising and rental revenues for human services and public benefit organizations. The coefficient estimate for taxable advertising revenues for arts, culture, and humanities organizations is particularly large (-$1.74); while the estimate for human services and public benefit organizations is -$0.51. The estimate for taxable rental activities for human services and public benefit organizations is -$0.77. Consistent with our prior analysis, we do not find any relationship between taxable activities and donations for either medical or educational nonprofits.
It is important to note that, for the disaggregated revenue analysis, all nonprofits are included in the estimation procedure whether or not they earn a particular type of taxable revenue. Because we include many observations with a zero value for particular types of taxable revenues in our regressions, the lack of variation causes standard errors to be higher making it harder to identify statistically significant associations. This lack of variation could be one reason that we fail to find significant associations between donations and the various types of disaggregated taxable revenues for the two types of charitable nonprofits.
Additional Empirical Estimation Issues
Ideally, we would use a lagged-changes specification to estimate the relationship between donations and taxable revenues. Unfortunately, our data does not contain a sufficient time series for this kind of analysis.
11 Similar prior research, which uses both lagged and lagged-changes model specifications, finds little difference between the results of the two models (Okten and Weisbrod, 2000) . As noted by Okten and Weisbrod (2000) , endogenous relationships may exist between current (White, 1980) . Observations are slightly less than those in Tables 2 and 3 We apply a similar procedure and find our results also largely unaltered. Perhaps a more important issue is the possibility of an endogenous relationship between donations and taxable revenues. It is possible that managers of nonprofits with low levels of donations choose to earn additional taxable revenues as a means of overcoming financial need. To address these concerns, we conduct several econometric robustness tests. Our primary analysis uses lagged values for taxable revenues (i.e., regressing this period's donations on last period's taxable revenues). If managers respond to low levels of donations by increasing the level of taxable revenues, donations in the current period would affect next period's taxable revenues, a difference of two lags from our analysis. Although this procedure mitigates endogeneity, to the extent that taxable revenues are highly correlated across periods, it cannot completely rule endogeneity out.
As a robustness test, we include controls for financial need where financial need is defined as total liabilities and/or the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. Results (untabulated) show that, after controlling for financial need, the coefficient estimates for taxable revenues remain largely unchanged Hence, we conclude that, after controlling for the effects of financial need, taxable revenues still have a negative effect on donations. As a more direct measure of the potential effect of endogeneity, we conduct a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (Hausman, 1978) using as instruments variables that prior research finds are associated with the level of taxable revenues nonprofits choose to earn, including tax rates, total liabilities, state population, gross state product, total assets, and total sales revenues (Yetman, 2001b) . Results of this test (untabulated) do not support the hypothesis of endogeneity (t-static 0.60). However, this result should be interpreted cautiously because the Durbin-WuHausman test is considered to be a low power test. Finally, to further test for the possible effects of endogeneity, we conduct a two-stage-least-squares (2SLS) analysis, instrumenting taxable revenues by tax rates, population, gross state product, and total sales revenues. Results of our 2SLS analysis are similar to our ordinary leastsquares analysis except that the coefficient estimate for taxable revenues is larger. Despite these efforts, it is possible that simultaneity persists, and our results should be interpreted accordingly.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper examines the relationship between donations and the taxable commercial activities of nonprofit organizations. Primary nonprofit revenue sources include donations and taxable and taxexempt sales of products and services. Revenues are taxable if they are from unrelated sources. Because nonprofits supply public goods, effectively relieving a government (and its taxpayers) from supplying the goods, it is important to understand what factors influence the supply of private donations to nonprofits. We use a confidential database of nonprofit tax returns to conduct an analysis of the effect of nonprofits' taxable activities on the supply of private donations. By focusing on the relationship between taxable activities and donations, our study is also able to examine the efficiency consequences of the unrelated business income tax.
We find that donations to arts, culture, and humanities organizations, and human services and public benefit organizations fall by approximately $0.55 for each additional dollar of taxable revenues earned.
We do not find that donations to educational or medical nonprofits are sensitive to the level of taxable revenues earned.
These results have several implications. First, the costs of lost donations reduce the financial benefits of taxable revenues. Second, the lack of an association between donations and taxable activities for educational or medical nonprofits suggests that the findings of some prior studies positing donor sensitivity to nonprofit commercialization may be premature. Finally, our results support Sansing's (1998) proposition that the UBIT promotes productive inefficiency and that elimination of the UBIT would, in certain circumstances, increase efficiency.
